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Abstract 
The research deals with the characteristics of the irregular labour. 
Current literature considers that irregular labour arises because of the 
heavy tax burden on labour, or because of the existence of regulations 
which impose too many constraints on the labour market. In Italy the 
labour market has some effective constraints, for instance, due to firing 
regulations, minimum wage legislation, or to regulations on multiple job 
holdings (for instance it is only since last year that retired people can 
have new jobs legally), whereas, regarding taxation, we think that it is 
not always a valid explanation of irregular labour.  Actually, during past 
years there were several facilities to new hiring, especially in Southern 
Italy. We suggest that irregular jobs can originate from different causes, 
and, consequently, they can have different characteristics, referred to 
as good and bad irregular match . As to our opinion, dual labour market 
theories are the main framework for studying this phenomenon. This 
theory assesses that there are two tiers in the labour market, therefore, 
two type of jobs: the jobs in the primary sector and those in the 
secondary sector; the secondary tier of the market is the one where 
turnover is more accentuated. This hypothesis is supported by some 
empirical observation about irregular labour. Actually, data available for 
Italy, (INPS), tells us that irregular workers, in the most of cases, have 
been employed very recently. The 85% of irregular workers censored 
by INPS during 2001 had been working for less than 12 months; the 
same percentage in 2002 was 0.88. Dual labour market approach has 
been used by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), who analyzed irregular labour 
in depressed areas. We use a similar framework, which is mainly 
adapted from the research of Acemoglu (2001), where dualism arises 
as endogenous choice caused by the different technology used in two 
different sectors.  
 
Keywords: bad irregular match, good irregular match. 
JEL code: E26, J31, J42.   5 
1. Introduction (1) 
Current literature on underground economy usually assesses that 
irregular labour arises because of the heavy tax burden on labour 
(Schneider and Enste 2002), or because of the existence of regulations 
which impose some constraints either on the supply side or on the 
demand side (Loayza 1996) of the labour market. 
In Italy the labour market has some effective constraints,  for instance, 
due to dismissal regulations, minimum wage legislation, or to 
regulations on multiple job holdings (it is only since last year that retired 
people can have new jobs legally), whereas, as to taxation, we think 
that it is not always a valid explanation of irregular labour. Actually, 
during past years there were several fiscal facilities for new hiring, 
especially in Southern Italy
2. 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether it is possible to model different 
kind of irregular jobs, investigating which determinants, other than 
taxation, can explain their existence. The analysis will be developed 
using the standard tools of the dual labour market theories. The debate 
about labour market regulations and labour market segmentation has 
been recently afforded by several authors (Acemoglu 2001, Yaniv 2001, 
Moen 2003). The analogy between bad jobs and irregular jobs has 
been already exploited in recent literature on underground economy 
(Kolm and Larsen 2001; Boeri and Garibaldi 2002; Cavalcanti 2002) 
even though achieving different interpretation of the wage in the 
irregular sector, which turns out to be higher (Boeri and Garibaldi 2002), 
or lower than the wage in the regular sector (Cavalcanti 2002). We will 
show how this apparently incoherence among similar models can be 
easily traced back to the existence of different typologies of irregular 
                                                           
1 This paper has benefited by observations from the participants to the XIV AISSEC 
Conference, and participants to the seminar held at the University of Salerno, 
Department of Economics. I want to thank Maria Rosaria Carillo, Bruno Chiarini and 
Erasmo Papagni for some useful comments to a previous version of this paper. I am 
responsible for any remaining error. 
2 We refer to several laws which allowed a lower cost of labour for firms operating in 
southern regions, using the instrument known as fiscalizzazione degli oneri sociali, in 
other terms a share of social benefits on labour were paid directly by the government. 
These incentives were drastically reduced due to EU’s competition regulations, but see 
section 2 for more details.   6 
labour, as already pointed out by, among others, Camera dei Deputati 
(1998), Bianco (2002), Carillo and Papagni (2002), CNEL (2000), 
Lucifora (2003), Marzano (2003), Meldolesi (2000), Svimez (2003). The 
hypothesis supported in this paper is the existence of two different 
irregular matches, a good irregular match and a bad irregular match 
(Marzano, 2003); actually, it will be demonstrated that irregular workers 
are better paid if involved in good match, while bad match offer low-pay 
and low capital intensive jobs.  
This hypothesis is also supported by empirical investigation, based on 
inspections done by the Institute for private sector’s social welfare 
(INPS). In fact, digits available for recent years, suggest the existence 
of two main categories of irregular workers:  
  workers who have a specific and additional gain acting in the 
irregular sector, because they keep a social insurance (retired or 
unemployed), or because they evade income taxation (extra 
hours of work not declared or dependent employee registered 
as autonomous, or eventually second job holders);  
  workers which seem to bear the decision to operate irregularly: 
minors, immigrants and at least a part of all the other irregular 
workers unknown to official registers that have no other revenue 
than the irregular one, which are the main category emerging 
from the INPS inspections.  
To catch this dualism inside the irregular sector, we have developed a 
model that in a first step excludes taxation on labour, coherently with 
some existing labour market policies which offset social benefit 
payments with fiscal incentives, but  assuming that irregular jobs, due to 
fiscal authorities controls, are risky for employers. It is demonstrated 
that in this situation irregular workers are paid less than regular workers 
to produce an homogeneous output. In a second step taxation on 
labour is added to the model, and it is shown that in this case net wages 
in the irregular sector can be higher than the corresponding 
remuneration in the regular field. The model thus confirms the existence 
of two different irregular matches: when taxation on wages is not 
effective, then the bad irregular match arises, the irregular technology is 
less productive and irregular workers would prefer to be regularly 
employed; on the contrary, in absence of fiscal incentives, taxation on 
wages can generate a second typology of irregular workers, which 
receive a higher wage, so that we refer to this situation as to the good   7 
match.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes some 
stylized facts about the characteristics of irregular labour in Italy, and 
also about some labour market policies. Section 3 describes a model 
able to unify the different visions of irregular labour in a framework of a 
segmented labour market. Section 4 concludes the  paper. 
2.  Some stylized facts 
In Italy the size of the irregular sector has been estimated by several 
authors, using different methods (ISTAT,2003; Bovi and Castellucci, 
1999; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Zizza, 2002; Chiarini and Marzano, 
2004). Nonetheless, only the official estimates allow to distinguish, in 
the generic aggregate usually defined as underground economy, some 
more specific measures, such as the size of irregular workers. This is 
the reason why we will refer to digits available by the National Statistical 
Office (ISTAT), which are quite detailed about irregular jobs/workers. In 
table 1 the official estimates realized by ISTAT are shown; these digits 
refer to the size of the underground economy for Italy as a whole, and 
they start from 1992.  
 
Table 1: The share of the underground economy in Italy 
Year  Minimal Hypothesis*  Maximum Hypothesis * 
1992 12.9  15.8 
1993 13.9  16.8 
1994 14.5  16.5 
1995 15.8  17.1 
1996 15.9  17.0 
1997 15.9  17.7 
1998 15.8  16.8 
1999 14.9  17.0 
2000 15.2  16.9 
* underground economy is calculated as % of total GDP Source: ISTAT 
 
Of course, as the percentage reported are quite high, the underground   8 
economy is a phenomenon which existence can be traced back in the 
previous years. 
In table 2 there are more detailed indications about the size of irregular 
workers at regional level. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of irregular workers on total workers (irregularity ratios), 
2001 
 Italy  North 
west 
North east  Centre  South 
Agriculture 33,0  21,0  25,8  27,6  41,5 
Industry 8,3  4,0  3,3  9,8  20,3 
Ind. strictly defined  6,0  3,4  2,9  6,8  15,4 
Building   15,7  6,9  5,1  18,5  28,9 
Services 16,8  14,5  14,3  16,4  21,0 
Total economy  15,3  11,1  11,3  15,1  22,9 
Source: ISTAT 
 
Digits reported in table 2 point out that the well known Italian economic 
dualism is confirmed also by the irregular economy: irregularity ratios 
are always higher in southern regions. Moreover, what is very 
interesting is the strong presence of irregular workers in the southern 
industrial sector. In fact, figures reported for northern Italy, ranging from 
3.2 to 4.5%, suggest that, in manufacturing, the irregularity is coherent 
with a structural phenomenon, linked, for example, to the presence of 
extra-hours of work not declared or to the presence of some immigrants 
not regularly registered. On the contrary, figures estimated for southern 
regions, ranging around 19%,  necessarily imply a deeper consideration 
and presumably ask for different explanations. 
In table 3 we report figures from inspections held by the Institute for 
private sector’s social welfare  (INPS) for the industrial sector. Not 
regular workers are recorded in two main different categories: black 
workers, whose status is completely irregular, and irregular workers, 
who are only partially out of rules. Numbers in columns represent the 
share of each typology of non regular workers as % of total non regular 
workers detected by inspections.   
 
 
   9 
Table 3: Typologies of irregular workers, 2001 (Based on INPS investigation) 























Sickness Insurance  0,05  0,04  0,06  0,07  0,03 
Unempl. Insurance  0,9  0,88  1,24  0,44  0,99 
Second job  0,18  0,25  0,29  0,12  0,06 
Minors 0,22  0,32  0,21  0,23  0,15 
Immigrants    9,8  14,37  14,95  10,56  1,36 
Students   0,23  0,15  0,36  0,44  0,05 
Retired   0,67  0,8  1,21  0,82  0,06 
Others   74,78  66,57  63,40  73,87  91,29 
Irregular Workers  12,94  16,54  18,08  13,33  5,59 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on INPS data.  
*CIG is a social benefit for people who are only temporary out of job. 
 
Some categories reported in the table can be considered less 
disadvantaged than others; it is the case for those defined as “irregular 
workers”, which have a regular job but are paid in irregular ways
3, or for 
some of the black workers, and in particular for people who benefit of 
several kinds of social insurance (CIG, sickness, unemployment, 
retirement) or experience irregularity as a second job. The situation is 
different for some other categories of black workers, such as minors 
and immigrants. Moreover, it is very remarkable the fact that these 
“privileged” workers amount only to a minor fraction of total irregular 
workers, and this is true in particular for southern regions. In fact, in the 
south of Italy the share of “irregular workers” is very low, 5.59%, and 
second job-holders are only a residual share, 0,06%, while the largest 
amount of irregularity stands out in the general category “others”, 
91.29%, where there are typologies of workers completely unknown to 
fiscal authorities, and, presumably, less advantaged. The situation for 
the north-east is quite different, and the same digits are, respectively: 
18,08% for irregular workers, 0,29% for second job-holders, and 
63.40% for the residual category “Others”. This evidence seems to 
                                                           
3 It is the situation of dependent employees which are registered as autonomous 
workers, or the situation of workers whose remuneration is partially not declared (extra 
hours not declared).   10 
support the idea to differentiate irregular workers in two categories, 
which, using the terminology of  the model developed in the next 
section, can be referred to as: 
  good irregular matches, for people more privileged, such as 
regular workers who are paid irregularly only for the extra-hours 
of work, people who benefit of some kind of welfare benefits 
(retired, unemployed, CIG), or second job holders; 
  bad irregular matches, which comprehends the large majority of 
irregularity detected by INPS, such as minors, immigrants and 
the residual category “Others”.  
As the usually accepted explanation of the irregular jobs is the too high 
cost of labour and/or the tax burden, here we report also some data 
about the size of public incentives to hiring, which were largely present 
in Italy, and especially in southern Italy, where irregular labour is, as 
shown, more widespread.  
 
Table 4: Some typologies of incentives to labour 
Typology Measure  Period  Areas 
Partial exemption 
social benefits 
5-30% of the gross wage  1984-‘94  Southern 
regions 
Total exemption social 
benefits (for 10 years) 
100% of the compulsory 
social security payment 
1976-‘94 Southern 
regions 
Total exemption social 
benefits (for 1 year) 
100% of the compulsory 





6-15% of the compulsory 
social security payment 
1994-97 Southern 
regions 
Tax Credit (l.449/97) 
for new firms 
- 1997-  Less 
developed 
areas 
Total exemption social 
benefits (l.448/98) 
- 1998-  Southern 
regions 
Tax Credit for new 
hiring  
- 2000-  Southern 
regions 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Contini (1998); Lucifora (2003).  
 
These incentives have had the form of partial or total exemption from   11 
social security payments in order to subsidize employment. Exemption 
from social security payment was considered a threat for the 
competitive market by the European Commission, and in 1994 it was 
decided to eliminate it by 1997
4.  
 
Summarizing, empirical evidence just described suggests: the existence 
of two typologies of irregular workers; a stronger presence of irregular 
workers, and also a higher percentage of the less advantaged irregular 
workers in the southern regions of Italy; the availability of strong 
incentives to hiring –total exemption from the payment of social security 
benefits– in particular in southern regions of Italy. These facts call for a 
deeper consideration of the effective role of taxation on labour on the 
extension of irregularity. The next section develops a model which will 
try to put together all these facts, showing how it is possible to link the 
absence of taxation on labour to a strong presence of irregularity, and in 
particular, to a strong presence of bad irregular jobs, simply introducing 
the chance to operate using different technologies of production. 
3. Modeling the dualism among irregular workers   
  The present section describes a model able to capture the two 
different typologies of irregular jobs previously referred to as bad and 
good matches. The main idea is to model the endogenous decision to 
enter in the irregular market without introducing necessarily neither 
institutional nor fiscal burden, but only allowing the firm to use different 
technologies, regular or irregular, for the production of an intermediate 
homogenous good. The irregular production is characterised by the use 
of irregular workers, e.g. workers not officially registered. The use of 
irregular labour is modelled first simply as a risky option, in absence of 
taxation on labour, and only in a second step taxation on labour input is 
introduced. This is an extreme solution which wishes to capture the 
empirical evidence discussed in section 2 about the presence of strong 
                                                           
4 To give an idea of the size of these subsidies, in Bodo and Viesti (1997) is calculated 
that in 1992 they accounted for the 2.2% of southern regions’ GDP.   12 
incentives on hiring available in Italy, and in particular in the south of 
Italy, for a quite long period. Taxation on profits is not explicitly 
examined, because it is not considered, in this specific model, a source 
of the irregular employment, but as a cost of production common to all 
the different typologies of firms. In fact, very often firms use irregular 
labour but are formally registered, so that they report their production to 
fiscal authorities. We will show that, in correspondence to the two 
different models – with and without taxation on labour- two different 
wages are contracted in the irregular tier of the labour market, and they 
are responsive to policy parameters. 
The framework of the analysis is a standard search model, in which 
there are two different varieties of jobs: regular and irregular. Irregular 
jobs are first modelled simply as secondary and risky jobs (no taxation 
on wage/Bad match). In a second step we will introduce taxation and 
verify its implications (taxation on wage/Good match). The model is 
mainly adapted on the model of dual jobs suggested by Acemoglu 
(2001).  
3.1 The production function 
Each firm produces a unique final good, using three different 
intermediate goods/inputs, whose aggregate production are defined as: 
YReg, for the regular and primary input, YBadR, for the regular but 
secondary input, and YBadIRR for the irregular and secondary input
5. 
Intermediate goods are immediately transformed into the final 
consumption good, which enter in the utility function of the agents. The 





Y Y Y Y
+ ≡
+ − + =
ρ ρ ρ α α
1
) 1 (  (1) 
  Intermediate goods are produced using labour, L, and capital, K, 
and the technology of production is Leontief: when a worker matches 
with a firm with the necessary capital equipment, he produces one unit 
of the regular (primary and secondary) intermediate good, and a share 
γ of the irregular intermediate good. Following Acemoglu (2001), the 
cost of equipment is a creation cost which is incurred when opening a 
                                                           
5 The choice to keep three different intermediate productions is useful to stress the 
complete homogeneity between the regular and the irregular intermediate goods.    13 
vacancy, in other words before the firm meets its employees. The 
amount of the equipment per worker required to produce the regular, 
the secondary regular and the irregular goods are, respectively:  
BadIRR BadR REG k k k ; ;     
And the technologies are: 
{}
{}
{} L k K Y
L k K Y










    ( 2 )    
With the assumption on the parameter γ in the irregular Leontief 
technology: 
γ<1 
This assumption wants to capture a lower total factor productivity in the 
irregular technology, which could originate from several causes: lower 
productive scale due to fiscal controls, worse entrepreneur ability, 
negative externalities
6. Intermediate goods are sold in competitive 
markets, so that: 
Bad Bad BadIRR BadR
REG REG
p Y Y p p
Y Y p











    ( 3 )  
The only necessary assumption, for the subsequent analysis, is that the 
market value of the intermediate primary good is higher than the price 
of the secondary intermediate good, so that
7: 
Bad REG p p >         ( 4 )  
3.2 No taxation on wages 
As in standard searching models, the process of matching in the labour 
market is represented by a matching function M(u, v) which is twice 
differentiable, increasing in its arguments, and presents constant 
returns to scale. The ratio v/u  represents the market tightness, θ, while 
the flow rate of match for a vacancy is M(u, v)/v, which is referred to as 
                                                           
6 The main results showed in the paper do not rest substantially on this assumption, 
even though they are strengthened. 
7 As we are assuming competitive markets the price of each intermediate good is equal 
to its marginal productivity.   14 
q(θ). Finally, we denote the share of jobs in the primary sector as φ. As 
in standard models of search, we define the value of employment, 
unemployment, vacancies and filled jobs.  
3.2.1 Workers 
In each instant of time workers can be: unemployed and looking for a 
job, employed in primary/regular jobs, employed in secondary regular 
jobs, or in secondary irregular jobs; the present discounted value for 








BadIRR. The simplifying assumption is that there is not searching on the 
job. In steady state the probability of finding a job when unemployed is 
θq(θ). Then, the value function of the unemployment is
8: 
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Where z represents an exogenous income for unemployed people, 
such as social security benefits
9, and δ represents the share of 
secondary regular jobs.  
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    (6) 
Equations 6 accounts for the possibility of job destruction, s, which is 
common to all jobs and is exogenous; besides, in the irregular sector 
there is another possible cause of matching dissolution, that is the 
probability to be detected by fiscal authorities, p.  
                                                           
8 The main aim of this paper is to show how the introduction of some non competitive 
market characteristics can cause a dualism in the labour market. This is why we do not 
model explicitly all the parameters of the model, while we concentrate the attention on 
the wages’ equations considering the parameters as exogenous. 
9 The implicit assumption about the unemployment insurance is its universality. We are 
conscious that it is not the real situation, because in Italy only workers fired in the 
regular sector can accede to unemployment insurance. This consideration would imply 
two different Bellman equations for unemployment: the first one including 
unemployment insurance for regular workers, and the second one for irregular workers 
without unemployment benefits. The main consequence would be a lower value for the 
outside option in the wages equations for irregular workers, which would reduce the 
remuneration of irregular workers.        15 
3.2.2 Firms 
On the firm side, the value function of filled jobs is distinct for the 
regular and non-regular jobs: 
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− + − =
γ
         ( 7 )  
0 π C J
D =         ( 8 )  
Equations 7 shows the value of filled jobs for firms; each regular job 
produces one unit of regular intermediate output, while an irregular job 
yields γ units of the irregular intermediate good. The net benefit for firms 
is the difference between the market value of the output and the cost of 
labour. But, it is also possible that workers quit their labour, the quit rate 
s is fixed and exogenous. In this case firms will lose the difference 
between the expected value of a filled job, J
F
i, and the expected value 
of a vacancy, J
V
i. When firms hire irregular workers, they also support 
the risk of an imposed job destruction, J
D, due to the intervention of the 
fiscal authority. The probability of being caught, p, is exogenous. The 
dead-weight loss of a forced destruction is set simply equal to a 
negative constant (equation 8). 







i J J q rJ − = θ    BadIRR BadR REG i , , =  (9) 
In fact, vacancies have a specific creation cost but there are no costs 
due to hiring activities, in contrast to what assumed in Pissarides 
(2000), so that the rate of return on the asset is simply the net return  
(J
F – J
V) yielded by the change of state occurring at the rate q(θ) 
10. 
Introducing the hypothesis that wage are set up on a Nash bargaining, 
and that workers have the same market power,β, in both sectors, we 
have
11: 
                                                           
10 Fiscal authorities’ controls only apply to filled jobs, not to vacancies. 
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As there is free entry on the firm side, in equilibrium it should not be 
possible for an additional vacancy to be posted and make expected net 
profits: the present-discounted value of expected profit from a vacancy 
has to be equal to the creation cost specific of each kind of vacancy. 

















     ( 1 1 )  
3.2.3 Wages equations 
In steady state, both types of vacancies meet workers at the same rate, 
and in equilibrium workers accept both types of jobs.    
Solving the system of equation (6)-(10), and using conditions (11), we 
get the wages equations for the three different jobs (see appendix A1): 
U
REG REG REG rJ rk p w ) 1 ( ) ( β β − + − =       ( 1 2 )  
U
BadR Bad BadR rJ rk p w ) 1 ( ) ( β β − + − =     ( 1 3 )  
()
U
BadIRR BadIRR Bad BadIRR rJ k C p rk p w ) 1 ( ] [ β γ β − + − + − =        (14) 
 
Workers get a share β, e.g. their bargaining power, of the firms’ surplus, 
and a share (1-β) of their outside option rJ
U. If we consider the wage 
equation for secondary irregular workers, equation 14, we observe that: 
1.  irregular employers want to obtain a value of output which must 
also cover the expected sunk cost of being detected, that is 
() BadIRR k C p − ; 
2.  the value attached to the outside option is unchanged. 
 
                                                           
12 This is another difference with Pissarides (2000) resulting form the specific 
interpretation about the creation cost ki assumed following Acemoglu  (2001).     17 
Three important results are achieved at this point: 
Proposition 1: there is a precise range for the optimal capital intensity 
in the three technologies: 
BadIRR BadR REG k k k > >      (15) 
Proof: see appendix A2 
 
The different cost/intensity of equipment implies a different 
technological content of the three intermediate productions. The 
equipment per worker is lower in the secondary irregular production, but 
this convenience is offset by the value, lower than unity, for the 
parameter γ. These results are coherent with an empirical experience 
that highlights the existence of irregularity in less innovative and more 
labour intensive productions. The technological gap between primary 
and secondary production (both of them regular) is clearly explained by 
the higher market value of the primary intermediate good. The 
technological gap which endogenously arises inside the secondary 
sector is due to the risk inherent the use of irregular workers. 
This simple range does not apply for wages, in fact:  
 
Proposition 2: the wage paid in the primary regular sector is higher 
than the wage paid in the secondary regular sector. 
Proof: see appendix A3 
 
This result is very interesting, because it implies a strong relationship 
between capital investment and workers’ remuneration in the regular 
sector, and it is absolutely coherent with Acemoglu (2001).  
 
Proposition 3: the relative wage in the secondary sector, in absence of 
effective taxation on labour, is indeterminate, and it depends upon the 
technology as well as enforcement policy parameters. 
Proof: see appendix A3 
 
In fact, if we write the wage gap in the secondary sector: 




BadIRR Bad BadR BAD BadIRR BadR Bad
k C p
rk p rk p w w w
− +
+ − − − = − = ∆ γ β β
 (16) 
 
We see that the gap has two different components: a first one, which 
sign is ambiguous, referable to technological differences between the 
two productions, and a second one, always positive
13, affected by the 
enforcement policy parameter p, representing the risk of the irregularity. 
Two different situations can occur: 
i.  wages are higher in the regular sector: a condition that would 
always ensure a positive wage gap, even assuming a weak 
enforcement, is: 




   (17) 
I will refer to this condition as a technological premium for regularity, 
because it depends on the parameters of the production function.  
ii.  wages are higher in the irregular sector: only the existence of a  
technological premium for irregularity and a weak enforcement: 




;  0 ) ( ≈ p E  
could cause a negative wage gap or a higher wage for irregular 
workers.  
 
Even though it is plausible to assume a quite low enforcement policy, 
the idea of a technological premium for irregularity is not easily 
defendable, so it is plausible to presume that equation 16 has a positive 
sign. It is possible to classify the irregular match here sketched as the 
bad irregular match, because the sign of expression 16 states the 
relative convenience to work in the irregular sector
14 for secondary 
                                                           
13 It is useful to remember that the penalty for irregularity, C, is a negative constant by 
definition. 
14 This model is not able to catch other important aspects of jobs’ remuneration, which 
would need to be characterised using an utility function. I refer, for example, to social 
security benefits, which are modelled as a tax on gross wage, but have also a positive 
impact on the worker’s utility.  Here I simply assume that jobs better paid, in terms of   19 
workers.  
 
These results draw from the assumption that there is no effective 
taxation on wages
15, but the firm is allowed to use a combination of two 
different technologies, one of which is risk free (the regular) while the 
other is risky. 
3.3 Taxation on wages 
It is possible to investigate whether, in presence of taxation on wages, 
the relative convenience to act in the irregular labour market changes 
for one or both of the parties involved in the match. The framework 
does not need strong modifications, and I will discuss only the 
necessary adjustments. As in the irregular market taxation is completely 
evaded, no changes are needed to get the wage equation for the 
secondary irregular jobs. On the contrary, introducing taxation on wage, 
τ, implies to change equations 6 to obtain the wage equations in the 
regular sector:   
) ( ) 1 (
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τ
τ
    (6’) 
In the appendix (A1) it is shown how to get the wage equation for the 
secondary regular jobs in presence of taxation: 
[]
U





τ − + −
+
=    (13’) 
As the derivation of the capital intensity in the different sectors was 
founded on the wage equations, preposition 1 no longer applies. In 
particular: 
 
Proposition 4: in presence of taxation on wages, capital intensity in the 
regular production decreases. In equilibrium capital intensity is still 
higher for the primary intermediate good compared to the secondary 
regular one, but in the secondary sector the relative capital intensity 
(regular versus irregular) is a function of fiscal policy parameters (τ;p;C). 
                                                                                                                                             
net wage, are strictly preferred. A possible future development of this paper will be to 
consider explicitly the fact that at least a share of taxation of wages enters in the 
Bellman equations for regular employment.  
15 Our assumption is that taxation is compensated by incentives to hiring.   20 
Proof: see appendix A2 
 
Taxation on wages alters the relative convenience to operate in the two 
secondary sectors (regular and irregular), and capital allocation is 
immediately affected. In fact, introducing taxation, capital invested in the 
secondary regular sector certainly decreases, even though it is not clear 
if this fall is so strong as to cause higher capital intensity in the 
secondary and irregular production. As capital intensity in the irregular 
sector is a decreasing function of the expected penalty rate, then the 
relative capital intensity in the secondary sector (regular versus 
irregular) is a function of all the fiscal policy parameters (τ; p; C): the 
highest is the level of taxation, and the weakest is the enforcement, the 
highest will be the relative capital intensity in the irregular production. 
   
Proposition 5: the introduction of taxation on wages reduces the net 
wage paid to regular secondary workers and can cause a positive wage 
gap for irregular workers.  
Proof: see appendix A3  
 
Taxation on wages has a direct effect on wages, due to discount factor 
of equation 13’, but also an indirect effect through the equilibrium level 
of capital intensity of the regular production. The incentive to act in the 
irregular sector seems to operate through both the inputs: firms are 
willing to pay a lower wage to regular workers and, coherently, they 
reduce the amount of capital they want to invest in the regular 
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The introduction of taxation on wages acts as a discounting factor, 
reducing the net wage paid to regular secondary workers, eq. 18, and 
can cause a positive gap for irregular workers, eq 16’. The necessary 
conditions to have a higher net wage in the regular secondary tier of the 
market are not very straightforward, and the sign of the relevant 
mathematical relation is ambiguous, depending on fiscal policy 
parameters as well as on technological parameters. Nonetheless, 
looking at equation 16’, some considerations apply: 
i.  the effect of the technological premium for regularity  





It is not yet a sufficient condition to have a positive wage gap for regular 
workers: fiscal policy parameters must be accounted for, because they 
can cause a different sign on the wage gap. In particular, if enforcement 
is weak (p approaches to zero), and taxation is sufficiently high, 
irregular workers could be better paid than regular ones, even in 
presence of the technological premium for regularity. In this case it is 
reasonable to assume that the decision to operate in the irregular sector 
is shared by employers and employees; 
ii.  if technologies are the same both in the regular and in the 
irregular production:  
BadIRR BadR k k = = ; 1 γ  
and the expected penalty is low, then wages are always higher for 
irregular workers;  
iii.  finally, the existence of a  technological premium for irregularity 
and a weak enforcement cause a negative wage gap or a higher 
wage for irregular workers. 
 
The analysis of secondary job wages just described shows how taxation 
can cause a strong incentive, for workers, to operate in the irregular 
sector, as irregular jobs can be better paid
16, giving rise to the good 
irregular match. Conversely, the first model, which supposes that 
incentives to hiring offset taxation on wages induce an opposite 
                                                           
16 See note 14.   22 
conclusion, wages are higher in the regular field (bad irregular match). 
These two extreme situations give a possible interpretation of the 
reason why, in reality and in theoretical literature, it has often verified 
the existence of a dualism even among irregular workers. Taxation in 
some economic context is not the only relevant motivation to the 
existence of the underground sector, and empirical evidence about the 
size of the underground economy in southern regions of Italy seems to 
be a robust confirmation of this hypothesis. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has shown how it is possible to model different typologies of 
irregular jobs, based on the different relative wage, considering different 
regimes of fiscal policy. A first typology of irregular job, arising when 
taxation is high and enforcement is weak, is characterised by a higher 
wage compared to an equivalent job in the regular sector, and 
presumably, by a shared decision to go idle by employer and employee 
(good irregular match). A second kind of irregular job, arising when 
taxation is offset by incentives and irregular technology is less capital 
intensive, pays a lower relative wage, and, presumably, is a second 
best solution for workers (bad irregular match).  
Empirical observation, and in particular digits from INPS inspections, 
seem to support the existence of a dualism in the irregular sector of 
labour market, based on a different convenience/motivation of the 
workers. 
 The innovative aspect of the paper lies in a specific model which is 
able to model both kind of irregular labour, and suggesting that they 
refer to different motivations: evading tax burden in the first case, and 
non-fiscal motivations in the second.  
A very interesting result of the model is the endogenous derivation of 
the capital intensity in each of the productive field modelled and the 
relationship between capital intensity and the decision to act in the 
irregular sector, which will need a deeper consideration. This allows to 
improve characterising irregular jobs, which, in absence of taxation on 
wages, are not only low-pay jobs, but also low-capital intensive. This   23 
seems to be coherent with some of the results shown in Carillo and 
Papagni (2002), about the less innovative content of the irregular 
production. Some possible hypothesis to explain this peculiar typology 
of irregular jobs are: the quality of human capital, as assessed in Carillo 
and Papagni (2002), strong negative externalities, cultural attitude, 
attitude toward risk and intensity of fiscal controls, abundance of 
unemployment and availability of technologies with different labour 
intensity.  
   24 
APPENDIX 
 
A1) Wages Equations 
No taxation on wages 
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And the analogous system needs to be solved to get equation 12. 
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Taxation on wages 
The introduction of taxation changes the starting system to solve to 
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A2) Capital intensities  
 
No taxation on wages 
 
To derive the range of capital intensities in the three technologies we 
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Where we have used the expression for wage (12) in the last equation, 
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Using the assumption that prices are higher in the primary sector, and 
equal in the secondary sector, it is immediate to verify that 
BadIRR BadR REG k k k > >  
 
Taxation on wages 
 
Considering the presence of taxation on wages causes a change in the 
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So that    27 
BadR REG k k >  
While the relative capital intensity in the secondary sector is no longer 
defined to begin with, but depends upon taxation: 




















In fact, as C increases the penalty lowers (C<0), so that optimal capital 
allocated in the irregular sector increases. 
 
 
A3) Relative wages 
 
No taxation on wages 
 
To investigate the size of the relative wages it is necessary to use the 
relevant zero profit conditions, as expressed in appendix A2, in the 
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Then it is easy to show that 
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Whose sign is not immediate. It is possible to have a more clear 
interpretation of the wage gap in the secondary sector using expression 
found in the appendix A1. The difference between equations 13 and 14 
is: 
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Taxation on wages 
Relative secondary wages 
Using some algebra it is possible to show that the difference between 
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Which sign from the beginning is quite difficult to define.       29 
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